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Abstract
Background: Executive walk rounds (EWRs) are a widely used but unstudied activity designed to
improve safety culture in hospitals. Therefore, we measured the impact of EWRs on one important
part of safety culture – provider attitudes about the safety climate in the institution.
Methods: Randomized study of EWRs for 23 clinical units in a tertiary care teaching hospital. All
providers except physicians participated. EWRs were conducted at each unit by one of six hospital
executives once every four weeks for three visits. Providers were asked about their concerns
regarding patient safety and what could be done to improve patient safety. Suggestions were
tabulated and when possible, changes were made. Provider attitudes about safety climate measured
by the Safety Climate Survey before and after EWRs. We report mean scores, percent positive
scores (percentage of providers who responded four or higher on a five point scale (agree slightly
or agree strongly), and the odds of EWR participants agreeing with individual survey items when
compared to non-participants.
Results: Before EWRs the mean safety climate scores for nurses were similar in the control units
and EWR units (78.97 and 76.78, P = 0.458) as were percent positive scores (64.6% positive and
61.1% positive). After EWRs the mean safety climate scores were not significantly different for all
providers nor for nurses in the control units and EWR units (77.93 and 78.33, P = 0.854) and
(56.5% positive and 62.7% positive). However, when analyzed by exposure to EWRs, nurses in the
control group who did not participate in EWRs (n = 198) had lower safety climate scores than
nurses in the intervention group who did participate in an EWR session (n = 85) (74.88 versus
81.01, P = 0.02; 52.5% positive versus 72.9% positive). Compared to nurses who did not participate,
nurses in the experimental group who reported participating in EWRs also responded more
favorably to a majority of items on the survey.
Conclusion: EWRs have a positive effect on the safety climate attitudes of nurses who participate
in the walk rounds sessions. EWRs are a promising tool to improve safety climate and the broader
construct of safety culture.
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Background
Many hospitals are implementing executive walk rounds
(EWRs), a widely used but unstudied activity to improve
patient safety [1,2]. EWRs vary from hospital to hospital,
but in general they consist of visits by hospital executives
to patient care areas to discuss patient safety issues with
providers. EWRs enlist leadership to break down the sig-
nificant barriers to discuss human error in healthcare. The
executive may ask providers to discuss specific events or
general processes that could put patients at risk for harm,
they ask for suggestions to improve safety, and verbalize
their commitment to improving safety. Discussions are
documented and lead to action which is followed by feed-
back to participants. EWRs help hospitals identify oppor-
tunities to improve care processes by utilizing the wisdom
of frontline providers, they demonstrate the executives'
and the organization's commitment to patient safety, and
they may improve provider attitudes about safety-related
issues. These attitudes are an important part of what is
often called a hospital's safety culture [3].
Improving safety culture is The National Quality Forum's
first of thirty safe practices for better healthcare [4]. The
concept is derived from industries and organizations such
as aerospace (NASA), nuclear power, aviation, and the
military (naval aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines)
that are known for their ability to reliably deal with risky
processes [3]. One important driver of safety in these set-
tings is a very explicit commitment to safety by leaders.
Other components of a good safety culture include a focus
on system improvement instead of blaming individuals
for mistakes, reporting and learning from errors, and
infrequent unsafe acts. A defective safety culture was high-
lighted as one of the organizational causes of the recent
space shuttle Columbia accident [5] and has been cited as
causes of high profile adverse events in hospitals.
Hospitals are feeling pressure to act to improve the safety-
related attitudes that are part of safety culture [4]. The true
prevalence of EWRs is not known, but at least 200 hospi-
tals have used EWRs through participation in Institute for
Healthcare Improvement collaboratives, and nine hospi-
tals in Boston are participating in a 3 year study of EWRs.
Over 100 more have requested a database to collect EWR
data. However, despite their face validity in the eyes of
these early adopters, no evaluation of EWRs has been
reported so many questions exist about how EWRs should
be conducted and whether or not they are effective. The
purpose of this study was to measure the impact of EWRs
on one important driver of safety culture – provider atti-
tudes about safety climate as measured by The University
of Texas Safety Climate Survey.
Methods
Overview
Safety culture has been be defined as "the product of indi-
vidual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, compe-
tencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an
organization's health and safety management [3]." Safety
climate, the primary outcome measure in this study, is
comprised of the provider attitudes about patient safety.
Safety climate is a part of safety culture (attitudes are part
of both definitions) and we measure it with the Safety Cli-
mate Survey (described in detail below). We theorized
that EWRs would improve individual provider attitudes,
which in turn would lead to improved safety climate (the
composite of provider attitudes).
Our primary hypothesis was that EWRs would improve
safety climate in clinical units. An underlying assumption
was that attitudes would improve even among individual
providers who did not directly participate in EWRs, due to
a spill-over effect from the providers who participated in
EWRs to those who did not. The existing model for EWRs
has not tried to target every provider in a clinical area. We
hypothesized that we would not have to expose all provid-
ers in a clinical unit to EWRs in order to improve the over-
all unit climate.
This was the first detailed study of EWRs so we had several
secondary (but a-priori) exploratory hypotheses: 1) that
the effect of EWRs would be stronger for providers who
participated in EWRs; 2) that the effect of EWRs would
vary by provider type; and 3) that some individual items
on the Safety Climate Survey would be more responsive to
EWRs than others. To test these hypotheses, we rand-
omized units in a hospital to receive EWRs or usual care
(the control group). The Safety Climate Survey was
administered prior to, and after EWRs.
Participants and setting
The study was conducted at Memorial Hermann Hospital,
a 711 bed urban tertiary care teaching hospital that con-
tained adult and children's hospitals. We grouped into
"units" the inpatient clinical areas (such as individual
ICUs or wards) that cared for similar types of patients or
provided similar services. The departments of radiology,
pharmacy, respiratory therapy, and physical therapy/
occupational therapy were each considered a unit and not
grouped with clinical areas. The Emergency Department
was not included. After this grouping process there were
23 units (the clinical care areas plus respiratory therapy,
radiology, pharmacy, physical therapy/occupational ther-
apy) eligible for randomization. A random number gener-
ator was used to allocate units to receive the executive
walk round intervention or to be in the control group.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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Intervention
Six executives (2 Vice Presidents and 4 Assistant Vice Pres-
idents) participated in the intervention. Our rationale for
choosing executives was to have executives visit units that
they also supervised. There was no literature to inform the
frequency of visits so the executives and investigators
decided that the executive should visit their units during
the daytime approximately once every four weeks for a
total of 3 visits. Each executive was accompanied by the
hospital's Patient Safety Officer and a staff member from
the Performance Improvement Department. EWRs were
scheduled in advance with managers for each unit. The
executive met with providers either in a common work
area on the unit such as the nurses station, or in a confer-
ence room. All providers present at that time were encour-
aged to attend (some providers had to continue patient
care), but attendance was not mandatory. The executives
had met with the Patient Safety Officer before the inter-
vention began to review patient safety concepts, to edu-
cate the executives about EWRs, and to review the
questions to ask during EWRs. These questions (Table 1)
were generated from the literature [1] and the hospital's
patient safety committee. Before asking the questions the
executives stated that patient safety was a priority for the
hospital, that the purpose of their visit was to foster a cul-
ture that encourages open communication and identifies
ways to improve systems, that all comments would be
kept confidential, and that no individual would be held
accountable for system flaws, for revealing errors, or voic-
ing their concerns. We did not enforce one standard script
for all executives. Walk round sessions lasted 30–60 min-
utes. At the close of each session the providers were asked
to tell two other providers in their unit who did not attend
EWRs about the session. This was done to try and magnify
the effect of the intervention and improve attitudes even
among those who did not directly participate in an EWR.
Outcome measure
The primary outcome measure was safety climate, meas-
ured using the Safety Climate Survey. The Safety Climate
Survey is derived from similar surveys in commercial avi-
ation [6] that measured safety-related attitudes of cockpit
crew members. We adapted the aviation survey for health-
care by incorporating existing concepts from healthcare
(especially research on safety [7] and organizational cul-
ture [8]), conducting focus groups with health care pro-
viders, consulting subject matter experts, and field testing
items. The first healthcare version was for intensive care
providers [9-11]. Our factor analysis of that survey identi-
fied a 7 item scale that we called the Safety Climate Scale.
We then added items to the questionnaire which have
been linked to safety and performance outcomes in prior
aviation research [12,13], as well items that were identi-
fied through discussions with hospital executives, quality
experts, and other end-users. This resulted in the 21 item
Safety Climate Survey that uses a 5-point likert scale where
1 = disagree strongly and 5 = agree strongly. Excluding this
study, over 8,000 healthcare providers in 251 clinical
areas in 52 hospitals have completed the survey and the
survey has been endorsed by the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement.
We administered the baseline Safety Climate Survey
between September 1st  and October 15, 2002. EWRs
occurred between late October 2002 and January 31,
2003. The survey was re-administered during March and
April 2003. We surveyed Registered Nurses, Licensed
Vocational Nurses, Nurse Managers, Pharmacists, techni-
cians, Respiratory Therapists, Physical Therapists, Occupa-
tional Therapists, Speech Therapists, and Dieticians. Float
pool staff were excluded although some non-float pool
providers also worked in more than one unit. We did not
survey physicians because many of them did not spend
enough time on a specific unit to notice changes in safety
climate over a short period of time, and their schedules
made it likely that they would not be exposed to the inter-
vention. Human Resources generated lists of eligible pro-
viders and unit managers reviewed the lists for accuracy.
Managers distributed the baseline surveys at meetings or
by placing them in mail boxes. To improve response rates
they redistributed surveys every two weeks during each
administration period. The post-EWRs surveys were
administered as described for the baseline surveys and
some providers completed the survey as part of previously
scheduled in-service training. We surveyed day and
evening shifts (even though walk rounds only occurred
Table 1: Examples of questions asked by executives during walk rounds.
Have there been any "near misses" that almost caused patient harm but didn't?
Have we harmed any patients recently?
What aspects of the environment are likely to lead to the next patient harm?
Is there anything we could do to prevent the next adverse event?
Can you think of any events in the past days that have resulted in prolonged hospitalization for a patient?
Can you think of a way in which the system or your environment fails you on a consistent basis?
What specific intervention from leadership would make the work you do safer for patients?
What would make this executive walk rounds more effective?BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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during the day) to measure if there was a spill-over effect
that could influence the overall unit safety climate.
The study was approved by the University of Texas Health
Science Center at Houston Committee for the Protection
of Human Subjects.
Statistical analysis
We could find no research that used EWRs as an interven-
tion to help us calculate sample size a priori so we used
the entire hospital (except the emergency department)
divided into 23 units as described above. We transformed
the five point response scale on the safety climate survey
to a 100 point scale and calculated means. The 100 point
scale is better understood by hospital administrators and
providers. We also calculated the percent positive safety
climate score: the percent of respondents in a clinical unit
who responded 4 or 5 (agree slightly or agree strongly) on
the five point scale.
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of the post walk rounds nurse respondents.
Walk rounds n (%) Control n (%)
Total 260 338
Type of Nurse
LVN 30 (11.5) 30 (8.9)
RN 207 (79.6) 291 (86.1)
Nurse Manager 23 (8.8) 17 (5.0)
Age (years)
Less than 30 86 (33.1) 87 (25.7)
30–34 39 (15.0) 45 (13.3)
35–39 34 (13.1) 42 (12.4)
40–44 42 (16.1) 68 (20.8)
45 and over 54 (20.8) 89 (26.3)
Missing 5 (1.9) 7 (2.1)
Years in this hospital
Less than 1 52 (20.0) 44 (13.0)
1–2 41 (15.8) 46 (13.6)
3–7 61 (23.5) 96 (28.4)
8–12 49 (18.8) 90 (26.6)
13–20 24 (9.2) 34 (10.1)
21 and over 17 (6.5) 10 (3.0)
Missing 16 (6.2) 18 (5.3)
Table 3: Themes identified during walk rounds.*
1. Medication ordering policy not followed (handwriting illegible, cannot identify ordering MD, etc.)
2. The medicaton administration record is not always reconciled with the most recent orders
3. Active interventions not maintained on the electronic medical record
4. Need to improve discharge education for patients on anticoagulants
5. House officers need better supervision when conducting procedures and nurses need a way to identify house officer training level and which 
procedures are appropriate for that level.
6. Difficulties in caring for medical patients with significant psychiatric problems
7. Management of overweight patients (inadequate equipment, difficulty turning, transporting)
8. Problems with TPN orders in neonatal intensive care
9. Inconsistent application of the falls prevention program
10. Difficulties in transitioning patients from Emergency Department to intensive care units (timing of transfer, use of different intravenous drug 
concentrations)
11. Improper use of oxygen tanks when patients transported
12. Beds not well maintained (wheel locks malfunction, frayed electrical cords)
*The hospital had not responded to items 6, 8, 9, and 10 prior to the follow-up safety climate survey.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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Our primary hypothesis was that units randomized to
receive EWRs would have higher mean safety climate
scores than control units. A secondary, a-priori, hypothe-
sis was that some individual items on the SCS would be
more responsive to EWRs than others. The five items were:
1) This institution is doing more for patient safety now,
than it did one year ago (item 15); 2) The senior leaders
in my hospital listen to me and care about my concerns
(item 3); 3) Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the
priority in this clinical area (item 19); 4) Leadership is
driving us to be a safety-centered institution (item 5); and
5) I would feel safe being treated here as a patient (item
11).
Another a-priori hypothesis was that the effect of EWRs
would vary by provider type and that the effect of EWRs
would be stronger for providers who participated in
EWRs. As part of the follow-up survey we asked providers
if they recalled participating in an EWR session (executive
names were listed by the question). Response options
included yes, no, and not sure. This resulted in three
groups in the intervention group (EWRs-participant,
EWRs-not sure if participant, and EWRs-not a participant)
and three groups in the control group (control EWRs-par-
ticipant, control EWRs-not sure if participant, and control
EWRs-not a participant). Some providers in the control
units received EWRs because they temporarily worked in
an intervention unit on the day EWRs occurred. We
hypothesized that mean safety climate scores would be
higher for providers in the intervention EWRs-participant
group than in the control EWRs-not a participant group.
Table 4: Effect of executive walk rounds on nurses responses to survey items: Distributions of responses by survey item and EWRs 
participation.
Survey Item EWRs Participant n (%) EWRs Non-participant n (%)
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree 
Slightly
Neutral Agree 
Slightly
Agree 
Strongly
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree 
Slightly
Neutral Agree 
Slightly
Agree 
Strongly
1. The culture of this clinical area makes it easy to 
learn from the mistakes of others.
0 2 (2.44) 15 (18.29) 22 (26.83) 43 (52.44) 6 (3.13) 21 (10.94) 50 (26.04) 53 (27.60) 62 (32.29)
2. Medical errors are handled appropriately in this 
clinical area.
3 (3.61) 2 (2.41) 12 (14.46) 12 (14.46) 54 (65.06) 3 (1.54) 17 (8.72) 38 (19.49) 48 (24.62) 89 (45.64)
3. The senior leaders in my hospital listen to me 
and care about my concerns.
3 (3.57) 6 (7.14) 15 (17.86) 26 (30.95) 34 (40.48) 29 (14.65) 23 (11.62) 40 (20.20) 54 (27.27) 52 (26.26)
4. The physician and nurse leaders in my area 
listen to me and care about my concerns.
0 6 (7.14) 11 (13.10) 27 (32.14) 40 (47.62) 10 (5.15) 20 (10.31) 40 (20.62) 56 (28.87) 68 (35.05)
5. Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered 
institution.
1 (1.19) 0 15 (17.86) 21 (25.00) 47 (55.95) 4 (2.03) 18 (9.14) 48 (24.37) 59 (29.95) 68 (34.52)
6. My suggestions about safety would be acted 
upon if I expressed them to management.
1 (1.19) 4 (4.76) 14 (16.67) 25 (29.76) 40 (47.62) 11 (5.58) 26 (13.20) 39 (19.80) 50 (25.38) 71 (36.04)
7. Management/Leadership does not knowingly 
compromise safety concerns for productivity.
3 (3.61) 5 (6.02) 14 (16.87) 24 (28.92) 37 (44.58) 17 (8.76) 21 (10.82) 33 (17.01) 53 (27.32) 70 (36.08)
8. I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any 
patient safety concerns I may have.
2 (2.41) 3 (3.61) 4 (4.82) 20 (24.10) 54 (65.06) 1 (0.51) 13 (6.63) 25 (12.76) 55 (28.06) 102 
(52.04)
9. I know the proper channels to direct questions 
regarding patient safety.
0 1 (1.23) 4 (4.94) 19 (23.46) 57 (70.37) 0 2 (1.03) 17 (8.72) 60 (30.77) 116 
(59.49)
10. I receive appropriate feedback about my 
performance.
2 (2.38) 4 (4.76) 10 (11.90) 26 (30.95) 42 (50.00) 6 (3.06) 24 (12.24) 38 (19.39) 59 (30.10) 69 (35.20)
11. I would feel safe being treated here as a 
patient.
0 2 (2.53) 13 (16.46) 21 (26.58) 43 (54.43) 5 (2.56) 20 (10.26) 35 (17.95) 62 (31.79) 73 (37.44)
12. Briefing personnel before the start of a shift 
(i.e., to plan for possible contingencies) is an 
important part of patient safety.
0 0 5 (6.10) 19 (23.17) 58 (70.73) 2 (1.04) 4 (2.07) 19 (9.84) 34 (17.62) 134 
(69.43)
13. Briefings are common here. 1 (1.30) 3 (3.90) 15 (19.48) 24 (31.17) 34 (44.16) 13 (7.30) 13 (7.30) 40 (22.47) 45 (25.28) 67 (37.64)
14a. I am satisfied with availability of clinical 
leadership (physician).
1 (1.25) 5 (6.25) 9 (11.25) 21 (26.25) 44 (55.00) 9 (4.62) 26 (13.33) 32 (16.41) 55 (28.21) 73 (37.44)
14b. I am satisfied with availability of clinical 
leadership (nursing).
2 (2.44) 3 (3.66) 8 (9.76) 31 (37.80) 38 (46.34) 12 (6.25) 13 (6.77) 33 (17.19) 60 (31.25) 74 (38.54)
14c. I am satisfied with availability of clinical 
leadership (pharmacy).
5 (6.33) 7 (8.86) 18 (22.78) 21 (26.58) 28 (35.44) 20 (10.53) 32 (16.84) 42 (22.11) 51 (26.84) 45 (23.68)
15. This institution is doing more for patient safety 
now than it did one year ago.
0 1 (1.32) 11 (14.47) 22 (28.95) 42 (55.26) 11 (6.11) 6 (3.33) 59 (32.78) 59 (32.78) 45 (25.00)
16. I believe that most adverse events occur as a 
result of multiple system failures, and are not 
attributable to one individual's actions.
0 4 (5.13) 8 (10.26) 24 (30.77) 42 (53.85) 8 (4.17) 16 (8.33) 23 (11.98) 65 (33.85) 80 (41.67)
17. The personnel in this clinical area take 
responsibility for patient safety.
0 0 8 (9.76) 23 (28.05) 51 (62.20) 2 (1.04) 9 (4.66) 26 (13.47) 75 (38.86) 81 (41.97)
18. Personnel frequently disregard rules or 
guidelines that are established for this clinical area.
30 (37.50) 10 (12.50) 14 (17.50) 12 (15.00) 14 (17.50) 47 (23.98) 43 (21.94) 39 (19.90) 40 (20.41) 27 (13.78)
19. Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the 
priority in this clinical area.
0 1 (1.27) 9 (11.39) 16 (20.25) 53 (67.09) 4 (2.02) 14 (7.07) 37 (18.69) 59 (29.80) 84 (42.42)BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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Mean safety climate scores
Differences in mean SCS scores were tested using random
intercept linear models to account for the non-independ-
ence of research participants nested within clinical units.
These models were fit using SAS PROC MIXED. Model
assumptions were verified by examining univariate histo-
grams and residual skewness and kurtosis values, and by
generation of residual-by-predicted value plots.
Analyses of group differences on individual items
Individual survey item responses consist of the ordered
categorical values that represent the scale response labels
of "disagree strongly", "disagree slightly", "neutral",
"agree slightly", and "agree strongly". Intervals between
these responses need not be equal. For this reason, we
employed a cumulative odds logistic regression model to
compare groups' odds of agreement on each survey ques-
tion. The performance of the cumulative odds model ben-
efits from ten or more responses per survey category [14].
Response categories were collapsed as needed to attain
this objective (described in the note following Table 4).
To obtain proper standard errors, confidence intervals,
and p-values adjusted for clustering of respondents within
clinical areas, we employed the SURVEYLOGISTIC proce-
dure in SAS 9.1.3 to fit the cumulative odds models.
Results
A total of 1119 providers (67%) completed the baseline
survey and 1,000 (55%) the post EWRs survey. There was
no difference in safety climate between the EWR and con-
trol units when all providers were analyzed. We only
report results for nurses (Licensed Vocational Nurses, Reg-
istered Nurses, and Nurse Managers) because we could
not detect an effect of EWRs on safety climate scores for
other providers. We randomized 23 units, 12 to the con-
trol group and 11 to the EWR group. Prior to EWRs, 547
nurses returned surveys; after EWRs, 598 nurses returned
surveys. The types of nurses whose attitudes were meas-
ured post-EWR, their ages, and experience in the organiza-
tion are shown in Table 2.
Providers and executives discussed specific issues during
the Walk rounds and 12 themes were identified (Table 3).
The hospital addressed 8 of the 12 themes prior to the fol-
low up administration of the SCS. Some actions to
address these themes were limited to units from which the
theme arose (n = 4), other actions affected all units (n =
5). The follow up survey was administered before the hos-
pital addressed: 1) difficulties in transitioning patients
from Emergency Department to ICUs; 2) problems with
TPN orders in neonatal intensive care; 3) Inconsistent
application of the falls prevention program; and 4) diffi-
culties caring for medical patients with significant psychi-
atric problems. Providers were notified of these changes
through staff meetings.
Mean safety climate score comparisons
All 547 nurses measured pre-EWR returned useable safety
climate data; by contrast, 570 participating nurses
returned useable safety climate data following EWRs.
Before EWRs the mean safety climate scores for nurses
were similar in the control units and EWR units (78.97
and 76.78, P = 0.458) as were percent positive scores
(64.6% positive and 61.1% positive). After EWRs the
mean safety climate scores and percent positive scores
were not significantly different in the control units and
EWR units (77.93 and 78.33, P = 0.854) and (56.5% pos-
itive and 62.7% positive). However, nurses in the control
group who did not participate in EWRs (n = 198) had
lower safety climate scores than nurses in the intervention
group who did participate in an EWR session (n = 85)
(74.88 versus 81.01, P = 0.02; 52.5% positive versus
72.9% positive).
Comparisons of individual safety climate scale items
The distributions of responses by survey item and by
EWRs participation are shown in Table 4. Compared to
nurses who did not participate, nurses in the Experimental
group who reported participating in EWRs responded
more favorably on the items hypothesized a priori to be
most sensitive to EWRs (Table 5). All five items showed
statistically significant differences in odds of agreement
with items for the EWR-participant compared to Control-
Non-participant groups: This institution is doing more for
patient safety now, than it did one year ago (item 15, OR
= 3.82, p < .001); 2) The senior leaders in my hospital lis-
ten to me and care about my concerns (item 3, OR = 2.15,
p = .012); 3) Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the
priority in this clinical area (item 19, OR = 2.79, p = .001);
4) Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institu-
tion (item 5, OR = 2.48, p = .002); and 5) I would feel safe
being treated here as a patient (item 11, OR = 2.05, p =
.002). Examination of the odds ratios listed in Table 5
shows that nurses in the EWRs-participant group exhib-
ited more favorable evaluations of safety climate through
their responses to the individual safety climate items than
did nurses in the control EWRs-not a participant group on
14 out of 21 items (Table 5; note that the items are labeled
1–19, but item 14 has three parts.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first published study to show
that EWRs can improve safety climate among some pro-
viders in hospitals. Nurses in the intervention group who
participated in EWRs had higher safety climate scores than
non-participants in the control group. However, EWRs
conducted in this manner did not result in higher safety
climate scores for all nurses in the intervention units com-
pared to the control units, suggesting a limited spill-over
effect from nurses who participated in EWRs to those who
did not participate. Furthermore, we did not detect anBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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effect of EWRs on the attitudes of other provider types.
This may be due to lack of power to detect a difference
(there were relatively small numbers of some other pro-
vider types) or because EWRs or the safety climate survey
may be less relevant to non-nursing providers.
Implications
Safety culture has been identified as a key safety practice
for healthcare by the National Quality Forum and other
experts because poor safety culture may contribute to
unsafe practices. We found that EWRs can positively influ-
ence safety climate (one component of safety culture)
among nurses who participated in EWRs. Our study
should be encouraging and informative to hospitals and
researchers who are experimenting with the use of EWRs.
The effect of EWRs on safety climate of participating
nurses was detected after a short intervention (3 months)
and after relatively minor changes in care processes.
Future research should address the "dose-response" rela-
tionship between EWRs and safety climate. EWRs may
need to be conducted more frequently, address a broader
range of topics, address a larger audience during rounds,
or occur for a longer duration than in our study (once a
month for three months) to influence other providers and
to have an impact on overall unit safety climate. A key
goal should be to expose as many providers as possible
(both day and night shifts) to the EWRs because the effect
on attitudes may not diffuse throughout a clinical unit
(although we had limited power to detect this effect). The
effect of EWRs may also be modified by the actions taken
to correct or address safety problems raised by providers
during the EWRs. The actions taken after this set of EWRs
were relatively minor in scope suggesting that the EWRs
themselves may be important mediators of safety atti-
tudes. More visible or more effective actions could result
in greater improvements in safety climate, both among
Table 5: Effect of executive walk rounds on survey items for nurses: Odds of agreement with an item for EWR Participants compared 
to EWR non-participants.
Survey Item OR 95% CI
1. The culture of this clinical area makes it easy to learn from the mistakes of others. 2.50 1.15 – 5.42
2. Medical errors are handled appropriately in this clinical area. 2.05 0.97 – 4.35
*3. The senior leaders in my hospital listen to me and care about my concerns. 2.15 1.18 – 3.92
4. The physician and nurse leaders in my area listen to me and care about my concerns. 1.89 1.13 – 3.16
*5. Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institution. 2.48 1.39 – 4.45
6. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to management. 1.89 1.04 – 3.43
7. Management/Leadership does not knowingly compromise safety concerns for productivity. 1.56 0.90 – 2.70
8. I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may have. 1.74 1.01 – 2.75
9. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety. 1.62 0.87 – 3.03
10. I receive appropriate feedback about my performance. 1.98 1.23 – 3.20
*11. I would feel safe being treated here as a patient. 2.05 1.31 – 3.19
12. Briefing personnel before the start of a shift (i.e., to plan for possible contingencies) is an important part of patient safety. 1.16 0.65 – 2.07
13. Briefings are common here. 1.56 0.89 – 2.73
14a. I am satisfied with availability of clinical leadership (physician). 2.14 1.35 – 3.42
14b. I am satisfied with availability of clinical leadership (nursing). 1.62 0.90 – 2.93
14c. I am satisfied with availability of clinical leadership (pharmacy). 1.75 1.13 – 2.72
*15. This institution is doing more for patient safety now than it did one year ago. 3.82 1.87 – 7.81
16. I believe that most adverse events occur as a result of multiple system failures, and are not attributable to one individual's 
actions.
1.70 1.17 – 2.48
17. The personnel in this clinical area take responsibility for patient safety. 2.29 1.26 – 4.17
18. Personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines that are established for this clinical area. 0.78 0.48 – 1.28
*19. Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the priority in this clinical area. 2.79 1.50 – 5.21
Notes:
1. N = 274 non-missing cases.
2. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals are derived via a five category cumulative odds logistic regression model fit using the 
SURVEYLOGISTIC procedure in SAS version 9.1.3. Confidence intervals are adjusted for clustering of participants within clinical areas. Each analysis 
is based on five ordered categories of response options: "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree", "strongly agree", with 
the following exceptions: Some items (1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19) had fewer than ten respondents who endorsed "strongly disagree" or 
"disagree"; for these items the "strongly disagree" and "disagree" categories were pooled to yield n-per-category greater than or equal to ten cases. 
Similarly, items 9 and 12 required pooling of the "strongly disagree", "disagree", and "neither agree nor disagree" categories to yield ten or more 
cases per category.
3. The odds ratios indicate the odds of an EWR participant having more agreement with an item than a EWR non-participant
4. Item 18 is reversed scored.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:28 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/28
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providers who participated in EWRs and those who did
not.
Limitations
Our ability to detect differences between the control and
EWR units was limited by sample size at the clinical unit
level (23 units in total) and because some nurses in con-
trol units participated in EWRs because they were floating
in another unit while a EWR occurred. Sample sizes of
non-nursing groups also limited our ability to detect
changes after EWRs.
Providers were not randomized so our provider level anal-
ysis that found a positive effect of EWRs may be biased.
There may be factors that influenced participation in
EWRs that also caused or were associated with more posi-
tive attitudes. The main determinant of participation was
whether or not the nurse worked days or nights (EWRs
were only done during the day). Day-shift nurses may
respond differently than night-shift nurses to EWRs.
Other reasons for non-participation for day-shift nurses
were that EWRs occurred on days that they did not work,
the nurse could have been too busy with patient care, or
they could have chosen not to participate. The EWR sched-
ule was determined by the executives, not nurse managers.
Generalizability is limited because we report findings
from only one urban tertiary care hospital and because the
EWR effect may be mediated by the individual executives
of this hospital. Executives were advised about the pur-
pose of EWRs and given questions to help guide their dis-
cussion (Table 1) but there was variability in the details of
each EWR. This makes our findings more generalizable in
that it mimics what most hospitals will do (use multiple
executives), but also less generalizable in that others can-
not exactly replicate our intervention. Future research
should investigate executive effects to better establish
what executives do well during EWRs, what level of exec-
utive is most effective, and whether a particular back-
ground (e.g., clinical/nonclinical) makes a difference.
Randomized trials usually assume that the intervention
(like a drug) is stable over time, and that the effect of the
intervention is independent of other factors in the envi-
ronment (although there are notable exceptions [15]).
EWRs is a social intervention that varies depending upon
the individual(s) conducting EWRs and the culture of the
units receiving the intervention. Therefore, a formative
evaluation that reports details of the interactions among
executive characteristics (leadership style, gender, posi-
tion in organization) and the units (size, recent safety
issues, work routines) would be informative, as would a
unit level analysis of safety climate scores. Future studies
should also consider comparing EWRs to visits by execu-
tives who simply introduce themselves and ask how
things are going. This may better isolate the effect of EWRs
over and above the effect due to an executive appearing on
the unit to talk.
Due to practical considerations for this particular hospi-
tal, we did not include physicians. Based upon our experi-
ence with other EWR efforts, inclusion of physicians in
EWRs may lead to greater improvements in the unit-level
safety climate because physicians may be positively influ-
enced by the EWRs, and because they may be leaders in
units so a positive attitude change could affect others on
the unit.
Many readers will wonder if improved safety climate leads
to reductions in errors and adverse events. We did not col-
lect such data but experience at other institutions suggests
that as error rates and lengths of stay decline because of
interventions, safety climate scores increase [16]. Others
may see safety climate attitudes as important outcomes
regardless of their relationships with errors and adverse
events, and research in aviation suggests a relationship
among attitudes and performance [12,13].
Conclusion
EWRs have a positive effect on the safety climate attitudes
of nurses who participate in the walk rounds sessions.
EWRs may need to be performed more frequently or for a
longer period of time than in this study in order to have a
broader influence on provider attitudes. Future research
should also look in detail at the interactions among exec-
utive and unit characteristics to better understand this
safety intervention. By embracing the knowledge of front
line providers, engaging them directly in improvement
efforts, and aligning the concerns of providers and leaders
[17,18], EWRs may improve safety climate and the
broader construct of safety culture.
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